Faced with growing economic and political turmoil within nations, international leaders must take a step back to analyze the historical conditions that fostered political extremism in specific areas. Crucially, they must also examine the strategies employed by past governments to combat such movements.
We are currently observing a surge in popular uprisings globally, which, as seen in Greece and the United States, could significantly destabilize local administrations. Therefore, leaders should carefully consider historical precedents to prevent repeating past errors. The rise and fall of the Italian Red Brigades serves as a valuable case study for understanding the forces driving the development of a political terrorist organization and its impact on society.
Growing class divisions in Italy
Governments throughout history have navigated a spectrum of social movements, from peaceful civil disobedience to violent acts of terrorism. In mid-20th century Europe, Marxist Communism was one of several collectivist ideologies that took hold. Between 1960 and 1980, European governments, including Italy, experienced various forms of political unrest.
In Italy, the failure of center-left coalitions to deliver promised reforms fueled worker and student movements, culminating in mass worker strikes between 1968 and 1970. Decaying university systems further radicalized students, creating fertile ground for extremism. This volatile environment, combined with a resurgence of Marxist-Leninist ideology, triggered a period of intense violence, as student activists within the workers’ movement began advocating for violent class warfare.
These radical organizations emerged largely from a perception that established Communist entities, such as the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and trade unions had abandoned the original principles of the Communist movement. These principles included expanding access to university education for Italian youth and improving working-class conditions in factories. As government commitment to these areas waned, so did public trust and the willingness to maintain social order.
For example, Italian student activists saw the cooperation between Communist party leaders and Christian Democratic officials as a betrayal of the working class because many policies harmed factory workers. The de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union relaxed Cold War tensions, allowing Italian businesses to integrate communist strategies with capitalist models.
However, Western business practices were viewed by some as the source of growing disparities between trade workers and union leaders, as business owners implemented advancing technologies at the expense of their workforce. This combination of rising tensions between factory workers and trade union leaders, coupled with discontent among frustrated university students, led to the formation of ultra-left radical groups. The Red Brigades, one such group, became one of Italy’s most notorious and violent extremist organizations since World War II, proving exceptionally difficult to track and dismantle.
From Foundation to Ideology: The Years 1969–1972
The Red Brigade, known in Italian as the Brigate Rosse (BR), was officially founded on October 20, 1970, by Renato Curcio, a student activist from the University of Trento, along with his girlfriend Mara Cagol and friend Alberto Franceschini. This ultra-leftist organization arose from the worker and student protest movements of the 1960s, where it professed support for local trade unions in their struggle against the right-wing political bourgeoisie. Initially, the Red Brigade focused its activities in major Italian cities like Milan and Turin, viewing itself as an offshoot of the extra-parliamentary movement Autonomia Operaia (AO). As a faction within this larger, fragmented movement, its leaders primarily “operated mainly in the factories, where social disparities were more evident and labor disputes more acute.”
However, these leaders also advocated for a revolutionary state attained through armed struggle, aiming to sever ties between the Italian government and its Western allies. Due to the group’s dissatisfaction with the union leadership’s treatment of factory workers and the government’s perceived failure to address critical social issues, the early ideological goals of the leadership centered on targeted attacks against “the establishment,” including unionists, politicians, and businessmen.
In late 1971, the Red Brigade shifted its internal terrorist tactics from a primarily tactical approach to a more strategic one. Members moved beyond local destruction of union leaders’ vehicles and factory equipment, escalating to broader attacks on union headquarters and business offices. This tactical evolution inevitably led the group toward targeting individuals, with the Red Brigade claiming responsibility for its first kidnapping in March 1972, that of factory foreman Sit Siemens.
Over time, the Red Brigade gained a reputation throughout Italy as one of Europe’s most steadfast and consistent leftist extremist groups. According to Donatella della Porta in Terrorism in Context, the Red Brigade’s Marxist-Leninist ideology became increasingly prominent, as evidenced by group documents stating that “the working class [was] the revolutionary subject, the capitalist system [was] the enemy, the state [was] the guard dog of the bourgeoisie, and [the] Christian Democracy [was] its party.” Essentially, the Red Brigade sought to expand its military and political platform on a national level by attempting to legitimize its tactics of political and physical retribution against the right wing.
The group’s structure was developed between 1973 and 1974
The leaders of the Red Brigades consistently considered their group and its ideology to be the true representatives of the Marxist-Leninist Communist movement. They viewed their actions as those of an “armed avant-garde,” working within the proletariat to build a political party. As a result, in 1974, Red Brigade leaders created the Strategic Directorate (DS) to establish the organization’s structure, comprising an Executive Committee, urban and regional divisions (colonne), and brigade fronts (fronti).
This initial structure resembled a military unit, with the Strategic Directorate functioning as a command element that set protocols and guidelines, and the Executive Committee acting as a headquarters staff, publishing guidelines and ensuring smooth daily operations. The “field unit” structure included urban and regional divisions designed to decentralize command and control along specific boundaries. Within each division, “front” elements were established to handle specific tasks like logistics, propaganda, and recruitment.
These elements reported to the Executive Committee and ultimately to the Strategic Directorate (DS) through a vertical chain of command. This compartmentalized structure centralized decision-making at the DS level while maintaining secrecy between divisions. Over time, this rigid structure required a more formal communication system to convey the leadership’s evolving objectives, as the previous informal network within factory communities became insufficient.
Doctrine
In 1975, the Red Brigades articulated their foundational doctrine in a “manifesto” titled the Resolution of Strategic Directorate (RDS), which defined their organizational goals. The RDS essentially declared the group’s objective as “a concentrated strike against the heart of the State because the [S]tate is an imperialist collection of multinational corporations.” This declaration provided justification for earlier political targets, including the 1974 murders of Italian Social Movement activists, and solidified the rationale for targeting local police and legal authorities to escalate terror operations in urban areas.
The RDS doctrine marked a significant departure from the Red Brigades’ initial focus on supporting local political activities within the broader worker’s movement. The manifesto shifted the organization’s alignment towards a nationalistic militant stance against regional authorities and the Italian State. This aggressive approach, resembling anarchism more than a political movement, ultimately eroded their support base as sympathizers became increasingly alienated from the group’s evolving ideology.
The Red Brigades’ doctrinal shift and terrorist activities prompted Italian officials to intensify counterterrorism efforts against the organization’s leadership and operational networks. By late 1976, increased security pressure led to the arrest of many original members, including Renalto Curcio and Alberto Franceschini. They and others suspected internal betrayal by Mario Moretti and Giovanni Senzani, alleging their collaboration with the CIA and Italian Security Services. Additionally, Mara Cagol, Curcio’s wife and a founding member, was killed by police after her arrest.
These arrests and the systematic counterterrorism response initially suppressed the militant activities of the original leaders. However, the Italian Government’s failure to completely dismantle the Red Brigades’ mid-level leadership allowed remaining members to consolidate and evolve into a more violent, disciplined, and radicalized organization, poised to capture national attention.
Transition Period (1976–1984)
By 1976, Italy’s terrorist activity had escalated to such an extent that it surpassed that of all other Western European nations. Some perceived this surge in violence as a consequence of the United States’ covert involvement in anti-communist destabilization efforts. The clandestine conflicts occurring in Italian cities between Cold War adversaries fueled rumors of the government’s impending collapse.
Benefiting from the ideological clashes surrounding social policies, the Red Brigade broadened its recruitment base from working-class areas to the intellectual circles of regional universities. This influx of intellectual input enabled the Red Brigade’s Strategic Directorate, under Mario Moretti’s leadership, to announce in the spring of 1977 that their “avant-garde” was ready to establish the Communist Combatant Party (PCC) to guide the working class forward.
However, internal discord during this reorganization led to the Red Brigade’s division into two factions: the First Position, characterized by its more violent approach and focus on confronting government security forces, and the Second Position, a more moderate faction that eventually faded, leaving extremism as the dominant ideology. This transformation, coupled with the influx of intellectual recruits, paved the way for the Red Brigade’s organizational evolution and a subsequent escalation of armed political activity, culminating in the 1978 kidnapping and assassination of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro.
The Beginning of the End: The Aldo Moro Episode
Initially, the Red Brigade was not considered a major threat to the Italian government, but rather just another leftist terrorist organization claiming to represent the working class. Previous counterterrorism efforts had successfully neutralized the original leadership, effectively eliminating or capturing all founding members.
However, the subsequent reorganization resulted in a smaller, more radical, and more dangerous group willing to escalate violence. This new violent approach became tragically evident on March 16, 1978, when Red Brigade members ambushed Prime Minister Aldo Moro’s car, killing his chauffeur and five policemen, and abducting Moro himself. Ironically, this attack occurred as Moro was on his way to present a plan to stabilize Italian politics by including the Communists in the government for the first time.
While the Red Brigade had targeted individuals before, this was the first time a high-ranking government official had been kidnapped by a leftist terrorist group in Italy. The kidnapping provided the Red Brigade with a national platform, which they used for the next 55 days to pressure the Christian Democrats to exchange Moro for ransom and the release of 16 brigade members.
However, neither the Italian government nor Christian Democratic leaders were willing to negotiate with the Red Brigade or meet their demands. One theory behind this refusal to negotiate suggests that Moro possessed information that would expose Operation Gladio, a secret CIA plot, in collaboration with Italian police, to dismantle the Communist movement using clandestine “stay behind” agents. This theory gained traction after a BBC interview with Italian Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga, who stated that Moro’s death weighed heavily on the Christian Democrats and that he had made the difficult decision to “practically sacrifice Moro to save the Republic.”
Tragically, the standoff ended when Red Brigade leader Mario Moretti allegedly assassinated the Prime Minister by shooting him eleven times in the back seat of a car. The assassination shocked the Italian public, who admired Moro, and ultimately led to the decline of the Red Brigade as public support for the leftist cause diminished. In the aftermath of Moro’s death, Italian authorities and politicians responded with a determination to wage an all-out war against the leftist network. The Italian government saw the Red Brigade’s attacks as a serious threat to the regime and vowed to take all necessary actions to restore stability.
Even imprisoned Red Brigade founders Curcio and Franceschini criticized Moretti for “bureaucratic and militaristic aberrations” that did not advance the cause of the proletariat. Eventually, the combined pressure from Italian security forces, who launched an effective information and military campaign against the terrorist organization, and the erosion of public support for the leftist movement led to the defeat of the Red Brigade. This violent period in Italian history would eventually come to an end in the early 1980s, but not before the Red Brigade tested its militant capabilities one last time before disappearing.
The case of the Dozier kidnapping
On December 17, 1981, the Red Brigade, an Italian militant group, kidnapped NATO Deputy Chief of Staff General James Dozier from his Verona apartment. Four members, disguised as plumbers, carried out the abduction. This marked a significant shift in the Red Brigade’s tactics and strategy, as it was the first time they had targeted a foreign national. Following the kidnapping, the Red Brigade issued demands that included a condemnation of both U.S. military forces and NATO. They also promoted the idea of a unified, international revolutionary movement across Europe. The group held a mock trial for General Dozier and released a lengthy document detailing their strategic objectives.
After 42 days, Italian police successfully located and rescued General Dozier. This event proved to be the Red Brigade’s final major successful operation. The kidnapping of an American General Officer triggered a strong response from Italian and NATO security forces. In the aftermath, Red Brigade members were either killed, arrested, or faded back into society, some attempting to reorganize. Despite the decline of the original group, their ideologies persisted, leading to the formation of a splinter group called the New Red Brigade in 1984.
The New Red Brigade (1984)
Emerging in 1984 after the dissolution of the original Red Brigades, the New Red Brigade, also known as the Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC), was a Marxist-Leninist organization. The BR/PCC advocated for “continuing [the] struggle between capitalist imperialism and the oppressed proletariat,” aiming to dismantle democracy and establish a new society through armed militant action. Their opposition expanded to include Italy’s NATO-aligned foreign policies, viewing the Italian government as a puppet state controlled by Western powers, thus making it their ideological adversary. Consequently, the BR/PCC targeted high-ranking Italian political and business figures, along with foreign policy officials.
Remarks made by group leaders in 2002 praising the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks drew increased scrutiny from United States intelligence agencies. Although the U.S. State Department did not designate the New Red Brigade as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, it placed the group on its terrorist watch lists in 2002 and 2003, and currently categorizes the BR/PCC as an “Other Terrorist Group.”
Unlike the Red Brigades, the BR/PCC refrained from using kidnappings to propagate their ideology or incite public fear. Instead, the organization persisted in employing assassinations and terrorist bombings as tactics to generate chaos within local Italian communities, thereby highlighting the government’s perceived inability to maintain security.
The BR/PCC’s first recorded attacks occurred in May 1999, with the assassination of Massimo D’Antona, an advisor to Italy’s Labor Ministry. Further, in April 2001, the group bombed the Institute for International Affairs in Rome, though no fatalities resulted. In March of the following year, the BR/PCC assassinated Labor Ministry Advisor Marco Biagi. While BR/PCC activity showed signs of escalation in previous years, 2003 marked a critical juncture for both the group and Italian authorities.
A shootout on a Florence-bound train in March resulted in the deaths of an Italian security guard and BR/PCC leader Mario Galesi. This incident also led to the arrest of another BR/PCC leader, Desdemona Lioce, who had been evading Italian authorities since 1995 and was implicated in the 1999 assassination of Massimo D’Antona. A subsequent police raid on Lioce’s apartment uncovered a cache of weapons, including pistols, hand grenades, and high-level explosives, believed to have originated from past connections with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
The Italian Response: The Finale (2003)
The resurgence of extremist activity in Italy triggered widespread public anxiety, evoking memories of the Red Brigades’ past terror. In response, Italian authorities intensified their counterterrorism efforts against the BR/PCC and its affiliates, employing a multi-pronged approach.
This included a strong media campaign and increased funding for informants, effectively isolating the group from the public. This strategy also facilitated police infiltration and the rapid dismantling of the BR/PCC network. A 2003 US Congressional report highlighted the crucial role of Italy’s rewards for information program in dismantling the Red Brigades, enabling law enforcement to identify members, map networks, and proactively prevent attacks through arrests.
These efforts culminated in the October 2003 arrest of six BR/PCC members linked to the March 2003 train bombings, followed by the January 2004 arrest in Cairo of two more members suspected of involvement in the 1978 Aldo Moro kidnapping and murder. The Italian government’s decisive actions severely crippled the BR/PCC, reducing its membership to an estimated 20 individuals.
Subsequent attempts by remaining Red Brigade members to merge with other leftist groups like the Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA) were hampered by ideological differences. This resulted in a significantly weakened organization that retains minimal capacity to advance its original Leninist-Marxist agenda.
Conclusion
The Red Brigade’s trajectory, encompassing its ascent and decline, alongside Italy’s counter-terrorism measures, serves as a valuable case study for counterterrorism analysis, illustrating a successful government response to militant political ideology.
The Red Brigade stands out as a left-wing extremist organization that came close to destabilizing a modern government. This highly motivated group, comprised of disciplined student and worker activists, skillfully exploited post-World War II sentiments surrounding perceived government overreach in worker’s rights. By intertwining Marxist ideologies with class warfare tactics, they effectively garnered popular support for their cause.
Like any political movement, the Red Brigade depended on public backing to thrive and expand, employing tactics ranging from robberies and bombings to assassinations and kidnappings. They rose to prominence by coupling targeted attacks on the government with a message of public support. However, their targeting of popular Italian political figures and high-ranking Western officers ultimately led to their downfall.
A key factor in the Red Brigade’s strategic failure was the growing disconnect between the organization and the public, fostered by Italian police through information operations and a novel “money for information” counterterrorism strategy. Ultimately, the political will of the people eclipsed the ideological fervor of the Red Brigade leaders, leading the public to recognize the group for what it was: a terrorist entity.
